with the view of establishing the true effect(s), or the absence thereof. If P, for instance, is the legal fact, and Q and R are phenomena which we think to be the possible effects of 1 In Sunni legal theory, including that of Sh�fi��, pure deductive arguments as well as argumenta e contrario were deemed necessarily linguistic, for the conclusion of such arguments was seen to be derived from the language of revelation rather than through the medium of rational inferences. In the background of this theory there lies the fundamental typology of certitude and probability, a typology which dominated and dictated the approach to legal analysis. Aside from considerations of authenticity, revelation was structurally and linguistically categorized into degrees of clarity, whereby the scale of certitude and probability could be applied. A Quranic text in which a rule is clearly specified needs no inference to deduce the legal norm therefrom. It was argued that the knowledge posited by such a text is necessary or immediate (dar�r�); the intellect, once exposed to it, has no choice but to comprehend it. Thus, when a genus is prohibited, for instance, it is immediately understood that each one of its species are also prohibited, even though the individual species are not specifically prohibited. This is why in the traditional exposition of legal theory deductive arguments are not recognized as such, but are instead identified as linguistic arguments. A glance at substantive and positive law books reveals the deductive character of arguments which are otherwise considered linguistic. Damascus, 1964 -65, II, 1037 Ab� Ish�q al-Sh�r�z�, al-Luma�f� Us�l al-Fiqh, ed. M. al-Na�s�n�, Cairo, 1326 H., p. 67. 
